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On Information and Complexity 
R o b e d  Rosen 
Introduction 
We introduce the  r a t h e r  wide-rangizg considerations which follow with a dis- 
cussion of the  concept of information and its role in scientific discourse. Ever 
since Shannon began to  talk of information theory (by which he meant a proba- 
bilistic analysis of t he  deleterious effects of propagating signals through chan- 
nels; cf. Shannon and Weaver, 1949), the concept has been relentlessly analyzed 
and reanalyzed. The time and effort  expended on these analyses must surely rank 
zs one of t he  most unprofitable investments in mode.rn scientific history; not only 
has there  been no profit,  but also the  currency itself has been debased to  worth- 
lessness. Yet, in biology, for example, the  terminology of information intrudes 
itself insistently a t  every level; code, signal, computation, recognition. It may be 
that  these informational terms a re  simply not scientific a t  dl; tha t  they are a tem- 
porary anthropomorphic expedient; a &on de parler which merely reflects the  
immaturity of biology as a science, to  be replaced a t  the  earliest opportunity by 
the  more rigorous terminology of force, energy, and potential which m e  the  pro- 
vince of more mature sciences (i.e. physics), in which information is never men- 
tioned. O r ,  i t  may be tha t  t he  informational terminology wkiich seems to  force 
itself upon us bespeaks something fundamental; something that  is missing from 
physics as we now understand it. We take this latter viewpoint, and see where i t  
leads us. 
In human terms, information is easy to  define; it is anything tha t  is o r  can be 
the answer to  a question. Therefore, we preface our more formal considerations 
with a brief ciiscussiori of t h e  status of interrogatives, in logic and in science. 
The amazing fact  is tha t  interrogation is not ever  z part of formal logic, 
including mathematics. The symbol "?" is not a logical symbol, as, for instance, =e 
"v", "A",  "3", or  "V1; nor is it a mathematical symbol. I t  belongs entirely to  
I~formal  discourse and, as f a r  as I k ~ o w ,  the  purely logical or formal chzracter  of 
interrogation has not been investigated. Thus, if information is indeed connected 
in an intimate fashion with interrogation, it is not surprising tha t  i t  hzs not been 
formally characterized in any real sense. There is simply no existing basis on 
which to  do so. 
I do not intend. t o  go deeply he re  L ~ t o  the  problem of extending f ormzl logrc 
(always including mathematics in this domain) so as to  include interrogatives. What 
I want to  suggest he re  is a relation between our inf o d  notions of interrogation 
and the  familiar logical operation "-"; t he  conciitional, o r  t he  implication. opera- 
tion. Colloquially, this operatior, can be rendered in t he  form "If A ,  then B". My 
argument involves two s teps .  First,  tha t  every  interrogative car? be put into a kind 
of conditional f orm: 
I f  A ,  then B ? 
(where B can be an indefinite pronoun like who, what, etc.,  as wel l  as a definite 
proposition); and second, and most important, that  every ~ ~ t e r r o g a t i v e  can be 
expressed in a more special conditional form, which can be  described as foUows. 
Suppose I know tha t  some proposition of t he  form 
I f  A ,  then B 
is true.  Suppose I now change or  vary A ;  that  is, replace A by a new expression. 
dA . The result is ul interrogative, which I can express as 
If dA , then 6B ? 
Roughly, I am treating t h e  t rue proposition "If A , then B ", as a reference,  2nd I 
zm asking what happens to  this proposition if I replace the  reference expression 
A by the  new expression 6 A .  I could, of course, do the  same thing with B In t he  
reference proposition; replace it by a new proposition d B  and ask what happens 
to  A .  I assert that  every interrogative can be expressed this way, in whzt I call a 
varicrtional f i r m .  
The importance of these notions for us lies in their  relation to  t h e  externzl 
world; most particularly in their  relation to t he  concept of measurement, and. to 
t he  notions of causality to which they become connected when a formal or  logical 
system is employed to  represent  whzt is happening in t h e  external world; tha t  is, 
to  describe some physical o r  biological system or  situation. 
Before discussing this, I want t o  motivate the  two assertions made above, 
regarding the  expression of arbi t rary interrogatives in a kind of conditional form. 
I do this by considering a f e w  typical examples, and leave the  rest to  the  reader  
for the  moment . 
Suppose I consider t h e  question 
"Did i t  rain yesterday?" 
First, I write i t  as 
"If (yesterday), then (rain)?" 
which is t h e  first kind of conditional form described above. To find the  variational 
form, I presume I know tha t  some proposition like 
"If (today), then (sunny)" 
On I n f i r m a t i o n  a n d  Complezity 
is true. The general variational form of this proposition is 
"If d(todzy), then b(sunny)?" 
Then, i f  I put 
b(today) = (yesterday), 
5(sunny) = (rain) 
I have, indeed, expressed my original question in the  variation& form. A Little 
experimentation with interrogatives of various kinds taken from informal 
discourse (of great interest a re  questions of classification, including existence 
and universality) should serve to make manifest the generality of the relation 
between interrogation and the impLicative forms described above; of course, this 
cannot be proved in any logical sense since, as noted above, interrogation remains 
outside logic. 
It is clear that  the notions of observation and experiment are closely related 
to the concept of interrogation. That is why the results of observation and experi- 
ment (i-e. data) are so generally regarded as being information. In a formal sense, 
simple observation can be regarded as a special case of experimentation; intui- 
tively, an observer simply determines what is, while an experimenter systemati- 
cally perturbs what is, and then observes the effects of his or  he r  petturbation. 
In the conditional form, an observer is asking a question which can generally be 
expressed as 
"If (initial conditions), then (meter readings)?" 
In the variational f o m ,  this question may be formulated as follows: assuming the 
proposition 
"If (initial conditions = 0), then (meter readings = 0) " 
is true (this establishes the reference, and. corresponds to calibrating the 
meters), we ask 
"If &initial conditions = O), then &meter readings = O)? " 
where, simply 
&initial conditions = 0) = (initial conditions) 
and 
&meter readings = 0) = (meter readings). 
The experimentalist, essentially, takes the results of observation as the refer- 
ence and asks, in variational f o m ,  simply 
"If b(initial conditions), then 6(meter readings)?" 
The theoretical scientist, on the other hand, deals with a different class of 
question; namely, those that arise from assuming a 6B (which may be B itself) and 
asking for the corresponding 6A. These are  questions that an experimentalist can- 
not approach directly, not even in principle. It  is the difference between the two 
kinds of questions which distinguishes between experiment and theory, as well as 
the difference between the explanatory and predictive roles of theory itself; 
clearly, i f  we give bA and ask for the consequent 6B, w e  are predicting, wherees 
if we assume 5B and ask for the antecedent 6A , w e  are explaining. 
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It should. be  noted tha t  exactly the  same duality arises in mathematics and 
logic themselves; that  is, in purely formal systems. Thus, a mathematician can ask 
(informally): If (I make certain assumptions), then  (what follows)? O r ,  t he  
mathematician can s t a r t  with a conjecture, and ask: If (Termat's Last Theorem is 
true), then (what initial conditions must I assume to construct explicitly a proof)? 
The former is analogous to  prediction, t he  la t te r  to  explanation. 
When formal systems (i.e. logic and mathemztics) are used to  construct images 
of what occurs in t he  world, then interrogations and implications become associ- 
a ted with ideas of causality. Indeed, t h e  whole concept of natural law depends 
precisely on the  idea tha t  causal processes in natural systems can be made to 
correspond with implication in some appropriate, descriptive inferential system 
(e.g. Rosen, 1984, where this theme is developed a t  great  length). 
But t he  concept of causality is itself a complicated one; a fact  largely over- 
looked in modern scientific discourse, to  i ts  cost. That causality is complicated 
has already been pointed out by Aristotle, for  whom aLI science was animated by a 
specific interrogative: Why? He said explicitly tha t  t he  business of science was to  
concern itself with "the why of things". In our language, these me just t h e  ques- 
tions of theor-eticzl science: If (B), then (what A ) ?  and hence we can say B 
because A. O r ,  in t h e  variational form, 6B because 6 A .  
However, Aristotle argued that  there  were four distinct categories of causa- 
tion; four ways of answering t h e  question why. These categories, which h e  called 
mcztertul muse, fornral cause,  efSLnent crruse, and final cause,  are not inter- 
changeable. If this is so (and I argue below that ,  indeed, it is), then the re  are 
correspondingly d t m r e n t  kinds of inf o m t i o n ,  associated with different causal 
categories. These different kinds of information have been confused, mainly 
because we are in t he  habit of using t h e  same mathematical language to  describe 
each of them; i t  is from these inherent confusions t ha t  much of t he  ambiguity and 
murkiness of t h e  concept of information ultimately arises. Indeed, we can say more 
than this: t he  very fact  tha t  the  same mathematical language does not (in fact ,  
cannot) distinguish between essentially distinct categories of causation means 
tha t  the  mathematical language we have been using is, in itself, somehow fundamen- 
tally deficient, and tha t  it must be  extended by means of supplementary struc- 
tures t o  eliminate those deficiencies. 
The Paradigm of Mechanics 
The appearance of Newton's m n c i p i a  toward t h e  end of t he  seventeenth 
century was surely an epochal event. Though nominally the  theory of physical sys- 
tems of mass points, i t  was much more. In practical t e m ,  by showing how the  
mysteries of the  heavens could be understood on the  basis of a f e w  simple, univer- 
sal Laws, i t  set t he  standards for explanation and.prediction which have been 
accepted ever since. I t  unleashed a feeling of optimism almost unimaginable today; 
i t  was the  culmination of t h e  ent i re  Renaissance. More than that: in addition to  
provi&ing a universal explanation for specific physical events, i t  also provided a 
language and a way of thinking about systems which has persisted, essentially 
unchanged, to the  present time; what has changed has only been the  technical 
manifestation of t h e  language and its interpretation. In this lznguage, t he  word 
information does not appear in any formal, technical sense; we have only words 
like energy, force, potential, work, and the  like. 
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It is important to  recognize the  twin roles played by Newtonian mechanics in 
science: as a reductionistic ultimate and as a paradigm for representing systems 
not yet reduced to  arrangements of interacting particles. The essential feature of 
this paradigm is the employment of a. mathematical language with an inherent dual- 
ity, which we may express as the  distinction between in t e rna l  s tates  and 
dynamicaL Laws. In Newtonian mechanics, the internal s ta tes  a r e  represented by 
points in some appropriate manifold of phases, and the  dynamical laws represent  
t he  internal o r  impressed forces. The resulting mathematical image is thus what is 
called nowadays a d y l a m i c a l  sys tem.  However, the  dynamical systems arising in 
mechanics are mathematically r a the r  special ones, because of the  way phases are 
defined (they possess a symplectic structure).  Through t h e  work of people like 
PoincarC, Birkhoff , Lotka, and many others over t h e  years, however, this dynami- 
cal system paradigm, or  its numerous variants, has come to  be regarded as t h e  
universal vehicle for t he  representation of systems which could not, technically, 
be described in terms of mechanics; systems of interacting chemicals, organisms, 
ecosystems, and many others. Even the  most radical changes occurring within phy- 
sics itself, Like relativity and quantum theory, manifest this framework; in quantum 
theory, for instance, there was t h e  most fundamental modification of what consti- 
tutes a s tate ,  and how it is connected to what we can observe and measure; but 
otnerwise, t he  basic partition between s ta tes  and dynamical laws is relentlessly 
maintained. Roughly, this partition embodies a distinction between what is inside 
or intrinsic ( the states) and what is outside ( the dynamical laws, which are formal 
generalizations of t h e  mechanical concept of impressed force). 
This, then,  is our inherited mechanical paradigm,  which in its many techni- 
cal variants or interpretations has been regarded as a universal language for 
describing systems and their effects. The variants take many forms; automata 
theory, control theory, and t h e  Like, but they all conform to tne same basic frame- 
work first exhibited in the  Prineipia. 
Among other  things, this framework is regarded as epitomizing the  concept of 
causality. W e  examine this closely here ,  because it is important when we consider 
the  concept of information within this framework. 
Mathematically, a dynamical system can be regarded simply as a vector field 
on a manifold of s ta tes ;  to  each s ta te ,  there  is an assigned velocity vector (in 
mechanics i t  is, in fact ,  an acceleration vector). A given s ta te  (representing what 
t he  system is intrinsically like a t  an ins tmi)  together with its associated tangent 
vector (which represents  what t he  effect of t he  external world on the  system is 
like a t  an instant) uniquely determine how the  system will change s ta te ,  o r  move in 
time. This t m s l n t i o n  of environmental effects into a unique tmgen t  vector is 
already a causal statement, in some sense; i t  translates into a more perspicuous 
form through a process of in tegra t ion ,  which amounts t o  solving the  equations of 
motion. More precisely, if a dynamical system is expressed in the familiar form 
in which tine does not generally appear as an explicit variable (but only @plicitly 
through its differential o r  derivation, d t ) ,  t he  process of integration manifests 
t he  explicit dependence of t he  s ta te  variables zi = zt (t ) on t ine,  
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This is z more traditional kind of causal statement, in which the  s t a t e  a t  time t is 
t reated as an effect, and the  right-hand side of equation (7.2) contzins t he  causes  
on wnich this effect  depends. 
Before going fur ther ,  le t  us take a look a t  t h e  integrands in equation (7.2), 
which are t he  velocities or ra tes  of change of the  s t a t e  variables. The mathemati- 
cal character  of t he  ent i re  system is determine2 solely by t h e  form of these func- 
tions. Hence, we can ask: What is it tha t  expresses this form (i.e. what determines 
whether our functions are polynomial?;, o r  exponentials, or of some other  form)? 
And given t h e  general form (polynomial, say), what is it tha t  picks out a specific 
function and distinguishes it from aIl others of t ha t  form? 
The answer, in a nutshell, is pa rame te r s .  As I have written t h e  s y s t e m  (7.1) 
above, no such parameters are explicitly visible, but they are a t  least tacit in t he  
very writing of t he  symbol f f  . Mathematically, these parameters serve as coordi- 
nates for function spaces; just as any other coordinate, they label o r  identify t h e  
individual members of such spaces. They thus play a very different role to  t he  
s ta te  M ~ l e s ,  which constitute the  arguments or  domains of t h e  functions that  
they identify. 
Here we find the  first blurring. For the  parameters which specify t he  form 
of the  functions f f  can, mathematically, be  thrown in as arguments of t he  func- 
tions f themselves; thus, we could (and in fact  always do) write 
where at are parameters .  W e  could even extend the  dynamical equations (7.1) by . 
writing daf  / d t  = 0 (if t h e  at are indeed independent of time); thus, mathemati- 
cally we can entirely eradicate any distinction between the  panmete r s  and the  
s ta te  variables. 
There is still one fur ther  distinction to  be made. We pointe2 out above tha t  
t he  parameters a* represen t  t h e  effects of the outside world on t h e  intrinsic sys- 
tem states.  These effects involve both the  system and t h e  outside world. Thus, 
some of t he  parameters must be  interpreted as intrinsic too (the so-called consti-  
t u t i ve  parameters), while  others describe t h e  state of t h e  outside world. These 
latter obey their  own laws, not incorporated in equation (7.1), so they are ,  from 
t h e  standpoint of equation (7.1), simply regarded as &nct ions  of time and must 
be posited independently. They constitute what a r e  variously called inputs, con- 
trols,  o r  forcings.  Indeed. if we regard the  states [zi (t)], o r  any mathematical 
functions of them, as corresponding o u t p u t s  (that is, output as a function of input 
r a the r  than just of time) we pass directly to t h e  world of control theory. 
So le t  us review our position. Dividing t h e  world into s ta te  variables plus 
dynamical laws amounts t o  dividing the  world into s t a t e  variables plus parameters. 
where t h e  role of t he  parameters is t o  determine t h e  form of t he  functions, which 
in turn define the  dynamical laws. The s t a t e  variables are the  arguments of these 
functions, while the  parameters are coordinates in function spaces. Further ,  we 
must partition the  parameters themselves into two classes; those which a r e  
i n t r i n s i c  ( the constitutive parameters) and those which are ez t r in s i c ;  that  is, 
which reflect  t he  nature of t he  environment. The intrinsic parameters are intui- 
tively closely connected with t h e  system iden t i t y ;  tha t  is, with t h e  specific 
nature or  character  of the  system itself. The values they assume might, for exam- 
ple, tell us whether we are dealing with oxygen, c=Son dioxide, o r  any other  
chemical species, and, therefore,  cannot change without our perceiving tha t  a 
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change of species has occurred. The environmental panmeters ,  as well as the 
state variables, however, can change without affecting the species of the system. 
These distinctions cannot be accommodated. with the simple lznguage of vec- 
tor fields on manifolds; that language is too abstract. We can only recapture these 
distinctions by (a) superimposing an informal layer of in t e rpre ta t i on  on the for- 
mal language, as we have done above, or (b) changing the language itself, to render 
it less abstract. Let us examine how this can be done. 
In order to have names for the various concepts involved, I call the constitu- 
tive parameters, which specify the f i m s  of the dynamical laws, and hence the 
species of system with which we are  dealing, the system genome; the remaining 
parameters, which reflect the nature of the external world, I call the system 
environment ,  and the s tate  variables themselves I call phenotypes.  This rather 
provocative terminology is chosen to deliberately reflect corresponding biological 
situations; in particular, I have argued (cf. Rosen, 1978) that,  viewed in this light. 
the genotype-phenotype dualism which is regarded as so characteristically bio- 
logical has actually a far more universal currency. 
The mathematical structure appropriate to reflect the distinctions w e  have 
made is that of genome-parameterized mappings from a space of environments to a 
space of phenotypes; that  is, mappings of the form 
specified in such a way that given any initial phenotype, environment-plus-genome 
determines a corresponding trajectory. Thus, w e  have no longer a simple manifold 
of states, but rather  a fiber-space structure in which the basic distinctions 
between genome, environment, and phenotype are  embodied from the beginning. 
Some of the consequences of this scenario are examined in Rosen (1978, 1983); we 
cannot pause to explore them here. 
Now we are  in a position to discuss the actual relation between the Newtonian 
paradigm and the categories of causation described earlier. In brief, if we regard. 
the phenotype of the system at  time t  as e m c t ,  then 
(1) Initial phenotype is  material cause. 
(2) Genome g i s  formal cause. 
(3) f , (a), as an operator on the initial phenotype, is efficient cause. 
Thus, the distinctions w e  have made between genome, environment, and phenotype 
are  directly related to the old Aristotelian categories of causation. As we shall 
soon discover, that is why these distinctions are  so important. 
Note that one of the Aristotelian categories is missing from the above; there 
is no f inal  cause.  Ultimately, this is the reason why final cause has been ban- 
ished from science; the Newtonian paradigm simply has no room for it. Indeed, it is 
evident that any attempt to superinpose a category of final causation upon the 
Newtonian world would effectively destroy the other categories within it. 
In a deep sense, the Newtonian paradigm has led us to the notion that  we may 
effectively segregate the categories of causat ion in our system descriptions. 
Indeed, the very concept of system state segregates the notion of material cause 
from other categories of causation, and tells us that  it is correct to deal with all 
aspects of material causation independent of other categories: likewise with the 
concepts of genome and environment. I, in fact, claim that this v e r y  segregation 
into  independent  categories of causat ion i s  the heart  of the Newtonian para- 
digm. When stated in this way, however, the universality of the paradigm perhaps 
no longer appears so self -evident. 
Information 
We said above that  information is, or can be, the  answer to  a question, and 
that a question can generally be put in the variational form: If bA,  then dB?. This 
serves as the connecting bridge between information and the Newtonian paradigm. 
In fact ,  i t  has played an essentiaI role in the historical development of Newtonian 
mechanics and its variants, under the rubric of v i r t u a l  displacements.  
In mechanics, a virtual displacement is a small, imaginary change imposed on 
the configurettion of a mechanical sys tem,  while the impressed forces are kept 
fixed. The animating question is: If such a virtural displacement is made under 
given circumstances, then what happens? The answer, in mechanics, is the well- 
known m n c i p l e  of R r t u a l  Work: if a mechanical sys t em is in equilibrium. then 
the virtual work done by the impressed forces as a result of the virtual displace- 
ment must vanish. This is a static (equilibrium) principle, but i t  can readily be 
extended f r o m  statics to dynamics, where it  is known as D'dkmbert's P r i n c t p k .  
In the dynamical case, i t  leads directly to the differential equations of motion of a 
mechanical s y s t e m  when the impressed forces are  known. Details can be found in 
any text on classical mechanics. 
In what follows, w e  explore the effect of such virtual displacements on the 
apparently more general class of dynamical systems of the form 
There is, however, a close relationship between the general dynamical systems 
(7.4) and those of Newtonian mechanics; indeed, the former systems can be 
regarded as arising out of the Latter by the imposition of a sufficient number of 
nonholonomic constraints. [l] 
As we have already noted. the language of dynamical systems. like that of 
Newtonian mechanics, does not include the word information; the study of such 
systems revolves around the various concepts of s tab i l i t y .  However, in one of his 
analyses of oscillations in chemical systems, Higgins (1967) drew attention to the 
quantities 
These quantities, which he called cross-couplings if i # j and self-couplings if 
i = j, arise fundamentdy from the conditions which govern the existence of 
oscillatory solutions to equations (7.4). It  turns out that i t  is not so much the mag- 
nitudes as the signs of these quantities that are important. In order to have a con- 
venient expression for the signs of these quantities, he proposed that we call the 
0 j th  s tate  variable, z, , an act ivator  of the i th ,  in the s tate  (z: ..... I,), whenever 
the quantity 
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and an inhib i tor  whenever 
U t j  (2; ,..., 2;) < 0 . 
Now, activation and inhibition are informational terms. Thus, Higgins' ter- 
minology provides an initial hint as to how dynamical language might be related to 
informational Language, through the Rosetta stone of stability. 
Now let us examine what Higgins' terminology implies. If z j  activates zt in a 
particular state,  then a (virtual) increase in z j  increases the ra te  of change of z, 
or, alternatively, a (virtual) decrease of z j  decreases the rate of change of z,. I t  
is, intuitively, eminently reasonable that this is the role of an activator. Con- 
versely, if z j  inhibits z, ,  i t  means that an increase in z j  decreases the ra te  of 
change of z,  , etc.  
Thus, the n Z  functions. uU (z l  .... z n ) ;  i , j = 1 ..... n , constitute a form of 
informational description for the dynamical system (7.4), which I have elsewhere 
(Rosen, 1979) called an activation-inhibition pattern. As we have noted, such a 
pattern concisely represents the answers to the variational questions: If we make 
a virtual change in z j ,  what happens to the ra te  of production of zt? .  
There is no reason to consider only the quantities ut j .  We can, for instance, 
go one step further,  and consider the quantities 
If we s tar t  from the dynamical equations (7.4), then nothing new is learned 
from these circumlocutions beyond, perhaps, a deeper insight into the relations 
between dynamical and informational ideas. Indeed, given any layer of informz- 
tional structure, we can proceed to succeeckg layers by mere differentiation. and 
to antecedent layers by mere integration. Thus, knowledge of any layer in this 
infinite a rmy of layers determines dl of them and, in part iculu,  the dynzmical 
equations themselves. If we know, for instance, the activation-inhibition pattern 
Intuitively, these quantities measure the effect of a (virtual) change in zk on the 
eztent  to which z j  activates or  inhibits z,.  If such a quantity is positive in any 
particular state,  it is reasonable to call zk an agonist  of z j  with respect to zt ; if 
negative, an antagonist .  That is, if utjk is positive, a (virtual) increase in zk 
increases or facilitates the activation of zt by z j ,  etc. The quantities ui jk  thus 
define another layer of informational interaction, which we may call an 
agonist-antagonist pa t t e rn .  
We can iterate this process, in fact to infinity, to produce a t  each state  T a 
family of n functions, u y  (z  l,.... z n )  Each layer in this increasing sequence 
describes how a (virtual) ch;;bge of a variable at  that level modulates the proper- 
ties of the preceding level. 
So far we have considered only the effects of virtual changes in state MI-i- 
ables, z j ,  on the velocities, dz, / d t  , a t  various informational levels. W e  could simi- 
larly consider the effects of virtual &placements at  these various levels on the 
second derivatives, d2zC / d t 2  (i.e. on the accekmt ions  of z t ) ,  the  third deriva- 
tives d3zt / dt3. and SO on. Thus. we have a doubly infinite web of informational 
interactions, defined by the functions 
rn a 
utjk...r ( Z 1  ..... 2,) = ' ' ' - 
azj 
f 
dz," 
- ' ' ' 
dtrn : I 
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ut (Z zn), we can r e c o ~ s t r ~ c t  t he  dynamic& equations (7.4) through the  rela- 
tiomhip 
(note in particV& tha t  the  differential form on the  right-hand side resembles a 
generalized w r k ) ,  and then set t he  function f (z . zn ) so determined equal to  
the  r a t e  of change, dzt / dt , of the  i th  s ta te  variable. 
However, o u r  ab i l i t y  to do all t h i s  dependsfundamenta l ly  o n  the ezact- 
nes s  of the di,#erent.inl fonns which ar i se  at  e v e r y  Level of o u r  web of infur- 
m t w n a l  interact ion,  and which relate each level to  its neighbors. If the  forms 
in equation (7.5) are not exact,  t he re  are no functions f (z z,) whose dif- 
ferentials are given by it,  and hence no rate  eqvat ions  of the f o n n  V.4). In such 
a situation, t he  simple relationship between the  levels in our web breaks down 
completely; the  levels become independent of each other,  and must be posited 
separately. So two systems could have the same activation-inhibition patterns,  
but vastly different agonist-antagonist patterns,  and hence manifest entirely dif- 
ferent behaviors. 
To establish firmly these ideas. let us examine what is implied by the require- 
ment tha t  t he  differential forms 
defined by t h e  activation-inhibition pat tern be exact. The familiar, necessary 
conditions for exactness here  take the  form 
for all i , j , k = I, ..., n . Intuitively, these conditions mean that  the relat ions of 
agonism and act ivat ion are e n t i r e l y  symmetrical (commutative); tha t  zk as an 
agonist of the  activator z j  is exactly the  same as zj as an agonist of the  activator 
zk ; and similarly for all other  levels. 
Clearly, such situations are extremely degenerate in informational t e r m .  
They a re  so because the  requirement of exactness is highly nongeneric for dif- 
f erential forms. Thus, these very simple considerations suggest a most radical con- 
clusion: that  the Newtonian paradigm, w i t h  its emphasis o n  dyhamical laws. 
res t r ic t s  u s ~ V o m  the outset  to a n  extremely special class of systems, and  that 
the most e lementary inf innat ional  considerat ionsforce us ou't of that class. 
We explore some of the implications of this situation in the  following section. 
Meanwhile, let us consider some of t h e  ramifications of these informational 
ideas tha t  hold even within the  confines of t he  Newtonian paradigm. These con- 
cern the  distinctions made in the  preceding section between environment, pheno- 
type, and genome; the  relations of these distinctions to  different categories of 
causation; and the  correspondingly different categories of information which 
these causal categories determine. 
First, Let us recd tha t  according to  the  Newtonian paradigm, every relation 
between physical magnitudes (i.e. every equation of state) can be represented as a 
genome-parameterized family of mappings 
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from environments to  phenotypes. I t  is worth noting specifically that  every 
dynamical law or  equation of motion is of this form, as is shown by 
Here, in traditional language, z is a vector of states,  a is a vector of external con- 
trols (which together with s ta tes  constitutes envi ronment ) ,  and t h e  phenotype is 
t he  tangent vector dz / d t  at tached to  t h e  state z .El In this case, then,  t he  
tangent vector o r  phenotype constitutes e m c t ;  t he  genome g is identified with 
formal cause, s ta te  z with material cause, and the  operator f (..., a )  with efficient 
cause. 
By analogy with t h e  activation-inhibition networks and their  associated 
informational s t ructures ,  described above, we can consider formal quantities of 
t he  form 
As  always, such a formal quantity represents  an answer to a question: Lf (cause Is 
varied), then (what happens to  effect)? This is t h e  same question as w e  asked in 
connection with the definition of activation-inhibition networks and their corre- 
lates, but now set in t he  wider context to  which our analysis of t he  Newtonian 
paradigm has led us. That is, we may now virtuaLly dlsplace a n y  magnitude which 
affects t he  relation (7.6), whether it be a genomic magnitude, an environmental 
magnitude, o r  a state variable. In a precise sense, t he  effect of such a virtual dis- 
placement is measured by t h e  quantity (7.7). 
I t  follows tha t  t he re  a r e  indeed different k i n d s  of information. What kind of 
information we are dealing with depends on whether we apply the  virtual displace- 
ment to  a genomic magnitude (associated with formal cause), an environmental mag- 
nitude (efficient cause), o r  a s ta te  variable (material cause). Formally, we can now 
distinguish a t  least t h e  following three cases: 
(1) Genomic information, 
a la (effect) 
a(genome) , dt 
(2) Phenotypic information, 
I \ 
(3) Environmental information, 
t \ 
We confine ourselves herein t o  these th ree ,  which generalize only t h e  
activation-inhibition pat terns  described above. 
W e  now examine an important idea; namely, the th ree  categories defined 
above a r e  no t  equiva len t .  Before justifying this assertion, w e  must briefly dis- 
cuss what is meant by equivalent. In generai, t he  mathematical assessment of t h e  
effects of perturbations (i.e. of real o r  virtual displacements) is t he  province of 
s tab i l i t y .  For example, t h e  effect on subsequent dynamical behavior of modifying 
or  perturbing a system s ta te  is the  province of Lyapunov stability of dynamical 
systems; that  of perturbing a control is par t  of control theory: and tha t  of per- 
turbing a genome relates to  structural  stability. To e s t a b h h  this firmly, le t  us 
consider genomic perturbations, o r  mutat ions.  A virtual displacement applied to  
a genome g replaces t he  initial mapping fg dete.-mined by g with a new mapping 
fg*. Mathematically, we say tha t  the  two mappings, f and f ,, are equivalent, o r  
similar, or  conjugate, if t he re  exist appropriate transformations 
such that t h e  diagram 
commutes; that  is, if 
for  every e in E. Intuitively, this means that  a mutation g H g ' can be counter- 
balanced, o r  nullified, by imposing suitable coordincrte t m n s f o m a t i o n s  on the  
environments and phenotypes. Stated yet  another way, a virtual displacement of 
genome can always be counteracted by corresponding displacements of environ- 
ment and phenotype so tha t  the  resultant variation on effect vanishes. 
We have elsewhere (Rosen. 1978) shown at great length tha t  this commuta- 
tivity may not always obtain; tha t  is, tha t  there  may exist genomes which are 
bifurcation points. In any neighborhood of a bifurcating genome g ,  t he re  exist 
genomes g ' for which f, and f,, fail t o  be conjugate. 
With this background, wereturn to t he  question of whether t he  t h ree  kinds 
of information (genomic, phenotypic, and environmental) defined above are 
equivalent. Intuitively, equivalence would mean that  t he  effect of a virtual dis- 
placement 6g of genome, supposing all else is fixed, could equally well  be produced 
by a virtual displacement of environment, 6a, or  of phenotype, Sp.  O r  s ta ted 
another way, t he  effect  of a virtual displacement bg of genome can be nullified by 
virtual displacements -6a and -bp of environment and phenotype, respectively. 
This is simply a restatement of t he  definition of conjugacy o r  similarity of map- 
pings. 
If all f o m s  of infomation are equivalent, i t  follows tha t  t he re  could be  no 
bifurcating genomes. We note in passing tha t  the  assumption of equivalence of t h e  
th ree  kinds of information defined above thus creates t e m b l e  ambiguities when i t  
comes to  explanat ion of particular effects. W e  do not cocsider t ha t  aspect here ,  
except  to say that  i t  is perhaps very fortunate that ,  as w e  have seen, they-are  
not equivalent. 
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Let us exarcine one immediate consequence of the nonequivalence of genomic, 
environmental, and phenotypic information, and of the considerations which cul- 
minate in that conclusion. Long ago (cf. von Neumann, 1951; Burks, 1966) von ru'eu- 
mznn proposed an influential model for a self-reproducing automaton, and subse- 
quently, for automata which grow and develop. This model was  based on the famous 
theorem of Turing (1936), which estabkshed the existence of a universal computer 
(universal Turing machine). From the existence of such a universal computer, von 
Neuma,.nn zsserted that there must also exist a universzl constructor. Basically, he 
argued that computation (i.e. following a program) and construction (following a 
blueprint) are both algorithmic processes, and that anything holding for one class 
of algorithmic processes necessarily holds for any other class. Tkis universal con- 
structor formed the central ingredient of the self-reproducing automaton. 
Now, a computer acts, in the language we have developed above, through the 
manipulation of efficient cause. A constructor, if the term is to bear any resem- 
blance to its intuitive meaning, must essentially manipulate material cause. The 
inequivalence of the two categories of causality, in particular manifested by the 
nonequivalence of environmental and phenotypic information, means that we can- 
not blithely extrapolate f r o m  results pertaining to efficient causation into the 
realm of material causation. Indeed, in addition to invalidating von Neumann's 
specific argument, we learn that great care must be exercised in general when 
arguing from purely logical models (i.e. from models pertaining to efficient cause) 
to any kind of physical 'realization. such as developmental or evolutionary biology 
(which pertain to material cause). 
Thus, we realize how significant are the impacts of informational ideas, even 
within the confines of the Newtonian para-, in which the categories of causa- 
tion are essentially segregated into separate packages. We now consider what hap- 
pens when we vacate the comforting confines of the Newtonian paradigm. 
Introduction to Complex Systems 
Herein, I call any natural system for which the Newtonian para- is com- 
pletely valid z simple system,  or mechunism. Accordingly, a complex system is 
one which, for one reason or another, resides outside this para-. We have 
already seen a hint of such systems in the  preceding section; for example, sys- 
tems whose activation-inhibition patterns utj do not give rise to exact differen- 
tials u,, dz, . However, some fur ther  words of motivation must precede a conclu- 
sion that-such systems are truly complex (i.e. reside fundamentally outside the 
Newtonian paradigm). W e  must also justify our very usage of the term complex in 
this context. 
What I have been calling the Newtonian paradigm ultimately devolves upon the 
class of dis t inc t  mathematical descript ions which a system can have, and the  
relations which exist between these descriptions. As noted earlier, the basis of 
system description arising in this para&gm is the fundamental dualism between 
states and dynamical laws. Thus, the mathematical objects which can describe 
natural systems comprise a category which may be called general dynamical sys- 
tems. In a formal sense, i t  appears that any mathematical object resides in this 
category, because the Newtonian partition between states and dynamical laws 
exactly parallels the partition between propositions and production rules (rules of 
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inference) which presently characterize all logical systems and logical theories. 
Ifowever, we argue that ,  although this category of general dynamical systems is 
large, it is not everything, and, indeed, it is far from large enough. 
The Newtonian pvadigm asserts much more than simply tha t  every image of a 
natural system must belong to  a given category. I t  asser ts  certain relationships 
between such images. In particular (and this is t he  reductionistic content of the  
parad.lgxn), i t  asserts tha t  among these images there  is t he  universal one, which 
effectively maps on all t he  others.  Intuitively, this is t he  master description o r  
ultimate description, in which every shred of physical reality has an exact 
mathematical counterpart;  in category-theoretic terms, i t  is much like a f ree  
object (a generalization of the  concept of f ree  semigroup, f ree  group, etc.).[3] 
There is still more. The ingredients of this ultimate description, by their  
very nature, a re  themselves devoid of internal s t ructure;  their  only changeable 
aspects a r e  their  relative positions and velocities. Given t h e  forces acting 
between them, as Laplace noted long ago, everything that  happens in the  external 
world is in principle predictable and understandable. From this perspective, 
everything is determined; there  a r e  no mysteries, no surprises, no errors ,  no 
questions, and no information. This is as much true for quantum theory as for clns- 
sical; only t h e  nature of s ta te  description has changed. And i t  applies to every- 
thing, from atoms to  organisms to  galnues. 
How does this universal picture manifest itself in biology? First,  from t h e  
standpoint of t he  physicist, biology is concerned with a r a the r  small class of 
extremely special (indeed, inordinately special) systems. In t h e  theoretical 
physicist's quest for  general and universal laws, there  is thus not much contact 
with organisms. As fa r  as he  or  she is concerned, what makes organisms speclal is 
not tha t  they transcend t h e  physicist's para-, but r a the r  t ha t  their  specifi- 
cation within the paradigm requires a plethora of special constraints and condi- 
tions, which must be superimposed on the  universal cenons of system description 
and reduction. The determination of these special conditions is an empirical task; 
essentially someone else's business. But i t  is not doubted tha t  t he  relationship 
between physics and biology is t he  relationship between the  general and the par- 
ticular. 
The modern biologist, in general, avidly embraces this perspective.[4] Histor- 
ically, biology has only recently caught up with the  Newtonian revolution which 
swept the  rest of natural philosophy in t h e  seventeenth century. The three- 
century lag arose because biology has no analog of t he  solar system; no way to 
make immediate and meaningful contact with the  Newtonian paradigm. Not until 
physics and chemistry had elaborated the  technical means to  probe microscopic 
properties of matter (including organic matter) was t he  idea of molecular biology 
even thinkable. And this did not happen until the  1930s. 
A t  present ,  t he re  is still no single Merent ia l  chain which Links any impor- 
tant  effect in physics to  any iaportant  effect  in biology. This is a f a c t ;  a datum; a 
piece of information. How a r e  w e  to  understand i t?  There a r e  vvious possibilities. 
Kant, long ago, argued that  organisms could only be properly understood in terms 
of final czuses or  intentionality; hence, from the  outset he  suggested tha t  organ- 
isms fall completely outside t h e  canons of Newtonizn science, which a re  applicable 
to everything else. Indeed, t he  essential telic nature of organisms preciuded even 
the  possibility tha t  z "Newton of t h e  grassblzde" would come along, and do for 
biology what Newton did for physics. Another possibility is the  one we have 
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already mentioned; we have simply not yet  characterized ail those special condi- 
tions which a re  necessary to  bring biology fully within t he  scope of universal phy- 
sical principles. Yet a third  possibility has developed within biology itself, as a 
consequence of theories of evolution; i t  is t ha t  .much of biology is t h e  result of 
accidents which are in principle  unpredictable a i d  hence governed by no laws 
a t  ail.151 In this view biology is as much a bran+ of history as of science. A t  
present,  this last hypothesis lies in a sor t  of doublethink relation with reduction- 
ism; the  two are quite inconsistent, but do allow modern biologists to enjoy the  
benefits of vitalism and mechanism together. 
Yet a fourth view was expressed by Albert Einstein, who wrote in a le t te r  to  
Leo Szilard: "One can best  appreciate, from a study of Living things, how primitive 
physics still is ". 
So, t he  present prevailing view in biology is that  t he  Newtonian canons are 
indeed universal, and we a re  lacking only knowledge of t he  special conditions and 
constraints which distinguish organisms from o ther  natural systems within those 
canons. One way of describing this with a single word is to  assert tha t  organisms 
are compkz .  This word is not well defined, but it does connote several things. One 
of these is that  complexity is a system property,  no different from any other  pro- 
perty.  Another is that t he  degree to which a system is complex can be specified 
by a number, or set of numbers. These numbers may be in terpreted variously as 
the  ciimensionality of a state space, o r  t he  length of an algorithm, o r  as.a cost in 
time or  energy incurred in solving system equations. 
On a more empirical level, however, complexity is recognized differently, and 
characterized differently. If a system surprises us, o r  does something we have not 
predicted, o r  responds in a way w e  have not anticipated; if i t  makes errors ;  if i t  
exhibits emergence of unexpected novelties of behavior, we also say tha t  t he  sys- 
t e m  is complex. In short ,  complex systems are those which behave counter- 
intuitively. 
Sometimes, of course, surprising behavior is simply the  result of incomplete 
characterization; we can then hunt for what is missing, and incorporate it into our 
system description. In this way, t h e  planet Neptune was located from unexplained 
deviations of Uranus from its  expected trajectory. But sometimes this is not t he  
case; in the  apparently analogous case of the  anomalies of the  trajectory of t h e  
planet Mercury, for instance, no amount of fiddling within the  classical scenario 
succeeded and only a massive readjustment of t he  parachgm itself (via general 
relativity) availed. 
From these f e w  words of introduction, we can conclude that  t h e  identification 
of complexity with situations where the  Newtonian paradigm fails is in accord with 
t h e  intuitive connotation of t h e  term, and is an  alternative to  regarding as com- 
plex any situation which merely is technically difficult within t h e  paradigm. 
Now let  us see where information fits into these considerations. We recall 
that  information is the  actual o r  potential response to  an interrogative, and that  
every interrogative can be put into the variational form: If b A ,  then 6B? The 
Newtonian paradigm asserts, among other  things, tha t  t h e  answers to  such interro- 
gatives follow from dynamical laws superimposed on manifolds of states. In their  
turn,  these dynamical laws a re  special cases of equat ions of s tate ,  which h k  or  
relate the  values of system observables. Indeed, t he  concept of an observable w a s  
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t he  point of depar ture  for our entire treatment of system description and 
representation (cf. Rosen, 1978); it was t h e  connecting Link between t h e  world of 
natural phenomena and t h e  entirely different world of formal systems which we 
use to  describe and explain. 
However, t he  considerations we have developed above suggest that  this world 
is not enough. We require also a world of variations, increments, and differentials 
of observables. I t  is true t ha t  every Linkage between observables implies a 
corresponding linkage between differentials, but as we have seen, t he  converse is 
not true. W e  are thus drawn t o  t he  notions that  a differential relation is a general- 
ized linkage and tha t  a differential form is a type of generalized observable. A dif- 
ferential form which is not t h e  differential of an observable is thus an enti ty 
which assumes no definite numerical value (as an observable does), but which can 
be incremented. 
If we do think of differential forms as generalized observables, then we must 
correspondingly generalize t he  notion of equation of state.  A generalized equation 
of state thus becomes a linkage o r  relation between ordinary observables and dif- 
ferentials o r  generalized observables. Such generalized equations of s ta te  are t he  
vehicles which answer questions of our variational fox-m: If bA, then 6B? 
But as we have repeatedly noted, such generalized equations of s ta te  do not 
usually follow from systems of dpnamical equations, as they do in t h e  Newtonian 
para-. Thus, we must find some alternative way of characterizing a system of 
this kind. Here is where t h e  informational language introduced above comes to  t he  
fore. Let us recall, for  instance, how we defined t h e  activation-inhibition net- 
work. W e  found a family of functions ut, (i.e. of observables) which could be 
thought of in t he  dynamical context as m&ulating the  effect of an increment dr j  
on tha t  of another increment d f t .  That is, the  values of each observable, ut j ,  
measure precisely t he  ex ten t  of activation o r  inhibition which z j  exerts on the  
rate a t  which zt is changing. . 
In this language, a system falling outside the Newtonian p a r a w  (i.e. a com- 
plex system) can have an activation-inhibition pat tern,  just as a dynamical (i.e. 
simple) system does. Such pat terns  are still families of functions (observables), 
ut j ,  and the  pa t te rn  itself is manifested by the  differential forms 
But in this case, t he re  is no global velocity observable, f i ,  that  can be inter- 
preted as t he  rate of change of z t ;  t he re  is only a velocity increment. It  should 
be noted explicitly t ha t  ut j ,  which define t h e  activation-inhibition pat tern,  need 
not be  functions of 'zc alone, o r  even functions of them a t  all. Thus, the  differen- 
tial forms which arise in this context a r e  different from those with which 
mathematicians generally deal, and which can always be  regarded as cross sections 
of t h e  cotangent bundle of a definite manifold of states.  
The next level of information is t he  agonist-antagonist pat tern,  utfk .  In the  
category of dynamical systems, this is completely determined by the  
activation-inhibition pat tern,  and can be obtained from the  la t te r  by differentia- 
tion: 
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In our world of generalized observables and linkages, uifk are independent of 
u t j ,  and must be posited separately: in other words, complex (non-Newtonian) sys- 
tems can have identical activation-inhibition patterns, but quite different 
agonis t-antagonis t patterns. 
Exactly the same considerations can also be applied to every subsequent 
layer of the informational hierarchy; each is now independent of the others, and 
so must be posited separately. Hence a complex system requires an in f in i t e  
mathematical object for its description. 
We cannot examine herein the mathematical details of the considerations 
sketched so briefly above. Suffice it to say that a complex system, defined by a 
hierarchy of informational levels of the type described, is quite a different object 
to a dynamical system. For one, i t  is quite clear that there is no such thing as a 
set  of states,  assignable to such a system once and for all. From this alone, we 
might expect that the nature of causality in such systems is vastly different to 
what i t  is in the Newtonian paradigm; we come to this in a moment. 
The totality of mathematical structures of the type we have defined above 
forms a category. In tkis category the class of general dynamical systems consti- 
tutes a very small subcategory. We are suggesting that the former provides a suit- 
able framework for the mathematical imaging of complex systems, while the latter, 
by definition, can only image simple systems or mechanisms. If these considera- 
tions are valid (and I believe they are), then the entire epistemology of our 
approach to natural systems is radically altered, and it is the basic notions of 
information which provide the natural ingredients. 
There is, however, a profound relationship between the category of general 
dynamical (i.e. Newtonian) systems, and the Larger category in which it is embed- 
ded. This can only be indicated here, but it is important indeed. Namely, there is a 
precise sense in which an informational hierarchy can be approximated,  locally 
and temponrily, by a general dynamical system. With this notion of approximation 
there is an associated notion of l imit ,  and hence of topology. Using these ideas, it 
can be shown that what we call the category of complex systems is the completion, 
or limiting set,  of the category of simple (i.e. d y n d c d )  systems. 
The fact that complex systems can be approximated (albeit locally and tem- 
porarily) by simple ones is crucial. It explains precisely why the Newtonian para- 
digm has been so successful, and why, to this day, i t  represents the only effective 
procedure for deaLing with system behavior. But in general, it is apparent that it 
can usually supply o n l y  approximations, and in the universe of complex systems 
this amounts to replacing a complez system with a simp& subsystem.  Some of the 
profound consequences are considered in detail in Rosen (1978). 
This relationship between complex systems and simple ones is, by its very 
nature, without a reduc tionistic counterpart. Indeed, what we presently under- 
stand as physics is seen in this Light as the science of simp& systems.  The 
relation between physics and biology is thus not at  all the relation of general to  
particular: in fact, quite the contrary. It is not biology, but physics, which is too 
special. We can see from this perspective that biology and physics (i.e. contem- 
porary physics) develop as two divergent branches from a theory of complez sys- 
tems, which as yet can be glimpsed only very imperfectly. 
The category of simple systems is, however, still the only one tnat we know 
how to use. But to study complex systems by means of approximating simple sys- 
tems resembles the position of early c a r t o h p h e r s ,  who were attempting to map a 
sphere while armed only with pieces of planes. Locally, and temporarily, they 
could do very well, but globally, the effects of the topology of the  sphere become 
progressively important. So it is with complexity; over short times and only a few 
informational levels, we can always make do with a simple (i.e. dynamical) picture. 
Otherwise, we cannot; we must continually replace our approximating dynamics 
with others as the old ones fail. Hence another characteristic feature of complex 
systems; they appear to possess a multitude of partial dynamical descriptions, 
which cannot be combined into one single complete description. Indeed, in earlier 
work (Rosen, 1977), w e  took this as the defining feature of complexity. 
I add a brief word about the status of causality in complex systems, and 
about the practical problem of determining the functions which specify their 
informational levels. Complex systems do not possess anything like a s tate  se t  
which is fixed once and for all. Also, the categories of causality become 
intertwined in a way which is not possible within the Newtonian paradigm. Intui- 
tively, this follows from the independence of the infinite array of informational 
layers which constitutes the  mathematical image of a complex system. Variation of 
any particular magnitude connected with such a system typically manifests itself 
independently in many of these layers, and thus reflects itself partly as material 
cause, partly as efficient cause, and even partly as formal cause in the resultant 
variation of other magnitudes. W e  feel that it is, a t  least for the most part ,  this 
involvement of magnitudes simultaneously in each of the causal categories which 
makes biological systems so refractory to the Newtonian paradigm. 
Also, this intertwining of the categories of causation in complex systems 
makes the direct interpretation of experimental results of the form: If 6 A ,  then 
6 B ,  extremely difficult. I f  we a re  correct so far, such an observational result as 
it stands is f a r  too coarse to have any clear-cut meaning. In order to be meaning- 
ful, an experimental proposition -of this f o m  must isolate the effect of a variation 
dA on a single informational level, keeping the others clamped. As might be 
appreciated, this will in general not be an easy task. In other words, the experi- 
mental study of complex systems cannot be pursued with the same tools and ideas 
that a re  appropriate for simple systems. 
One final conceptual remark is also needed. As mentioned earlier, the 
Newtonian paradqm has no room for the category of final causation. This category 
is closely linked to the notion of anticipation, which in turn is Linked to the ability 
of systems to possess internal predictive models of themselves and their environ- 
ments, which can be utilized for the control of present actions. We have argued a t  
great length elsewhere (cf . Rosen, 1984) that anticipatory control is indeed a dis- 
tinguishmg feature of the organic world, and have described some of the unique 
features of such anticipatory systems. Herein we have shown that for a system to 
be anticipatory, i t  must be complex. Thus, our entire treatment of anticipatory 
systems becomes a corollary of complexity. In other words, complex systems czn 
admit the category of final causation in a perfectly rigorous, scientifically accept- 
able way. Perhaps this alone is sufficient recompense for abandoning the comfort- 
ing confines of the Newtonian paradigm, which hzs served so well over the centu- 
ries. It will continue to serve us well ,  provided we recognize its restrictions and 
limitations, as wel l  as its strengths. 
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Notes 
Newton's original particle mechanics, o r  vectorial mechanics. is hard to apply to 
many practical problems, and w a s  early on (through the work of people like Euler 
and Lagrange) transmuted into another form, generally called a n d y t i c a l  mechan- 
ics .  This latter form is usually used to deal with extended mztter (e.g. rigid 
bodies). In particle mechanics, the rigidity of a macroscopic body is a consequence 
of interparticle forces, which must be explicitly taken into account in describing 
the system. Thus, ff there  a r e  N particles in the system (however large N may be) 
there is a phase space of 6N dimensions, and a set of dynamical equations which 
expresses for  each particle the resultant of aU forces experienced by that parti- 
cle. In analytical mechanics, on the other hand, any rigid body can be completely 
described by giving only six configurational coordinates (e.g. the coordinates of 
the center of mass, and three angles of rotation about the center of mass), how- 
ever many particles i t  contains. F r o m  the particulate approach the internal forces 
which generate rigidity a r e  replaced by cons tra in ts ;  supplementary conditions on 
the configuration space which must be identically satisfied. Thus, the passage f r o m  
particle mechanics to analytical mechanics involves a partition of the forces in an 
extended system into two classes: (a) the internal o r  reactive forces, which hold 
the s y s t e m  together, and (b) the impressed forces, which push the sys t em around. 
The former a r e  represented in analytical mechanics by algebraic constraints, the 
latter by differential equations in the configuration variables (six fo r  a rigid 
body 1. 
A s y s t e m  in analytical mechanics may have additional constraints imposed 
upon it by specific circumstances; for  example, a ball may roll on a table top. It 
was recognized long ago that these additional constraints (which, like dl con- 
straints, a r e  regarded as expressing the operation of reactive forces) can be of 
two types, which were called by Hertz holonomic and nonholonomic. Both kinds of 
constraints can be expressed locally, in infinitesimal form, as 
where z l ,  ..., zn a r e  the configuration coordinates of the system. For a holonomic 
constraint, t!e above differential form is exact; that is, the differential of some 
global function cp(zl, ..., z, ) is defined over the whole configuration space. Thus, 
the holonomic constraint translates into a global relation 
This means that the configurational variables a r e  no longer independent, and that 
one of them can be expressed as a function of the others. The constraint thus 
reduces the dimension of the configuration space by one, and therefore reduces 
the dimension of the phase space by t w o .  
A nonholonomic constraint, on the other hand, does not allow us to eliminate a 
configurational variable in this fashion. However, since it represents a relation 
between the configuration variables and their differentials, it does allow us to 
eliminate a coordinate of veloci ty ,  while leaving the dimension of the configuration 
space unaltered. That is, a nonholonomic constraint serves to elirmnate one degree 
of freedom of the system. It thus also eliminates one dimension from the space of 
impressed forces which can be imposed on the system without violating the con- 
straint. 
Similarly, if we impose r independent nonholonomic constraints on our sys- 
tem, w e  (a) keep the original dimension of the configuration space; (b) eliminate r 
coordinates of velocity, and thus reduce the dimensionality of the phase space by 
r ;  and (c) similarly, reduce by r the dimensionality of the set of impressed forces 
which can be imposed on the system. 
Let us express these facts mathematically. A nonholonomic constraint can be 
expressed locally in the general form 
which can (locally) be solved for one of the velocity coordinates (dz l /d t ,  say). 
Thus, it can be written in the form 
where we have written a = (z2, ..., dz, / d t  ). [At this point the reader  is invited to 
compare this relation with equation (7.6) in the main text.] 
Likewise, if there a r e  r nonholonomic constraints, these can be expressed 
locally by r equations 
&*/dt  = $I*(z1 ,..., z,, a )  2 = 1 .*** 9 7  
where now a is the vector (z, +l ,..., z, , dz, + '/dt ,..., dz, / dt ). These equations of 
constraint, which intuitively arise from the reuctive forces holding the system 
together, now become more and more clearly the type of equations we always use to 
describe general dynamical o r  control systems. 
Now what happens if r = n ?  In this case, the constraints leave us only one 
degree of freedom; they determine a vector field on the conpiguration space. 
There is in effect only one impressed force that can be imposed on such a system, 
and its only effect is to move the system; once moving, the motion is determined 
entirely by the reactive forces, and not by the impressed force. Mathematically, 
the situation is that of an autonomous dynamic81 sys t em,  whose manifold of states is 
the con,j%guratzon space of the original mechanical system. 
This relationship between dynamics and mechanics is quite different from the 
usual one, in which the manifoLd of states is thought of as generalizing the mechani- 
cal notion of phase, and the equations of motion as generalizing the impressed 
force. In the above interpretation, however, it is quite different; the manifold of 
states correspond now to mechanical con,j%gurations. and the equations of motion 
come from the reactive forces. 
The reader should be most careful not to confuse two kinds of propositions, which 
a r e  equivalent mathematically but completely different epistemologically and 
causally. On the one hand, w e  have a statement Like 
This is a local proposition, linking a tangent vector o r  vebcity & / dt to a state 
z ,  a genome g , and a control a. Each of these quantities is derived f r o m  observ- 
ables assuming definite numerical values at any instant of time, and it is their 
values a t  a common i n s t a n t  which are related by this proposition. 
On the other hand, the integrated form of these dynamical relations is 
t 
This relationship involves time ezplicitly and links the values of observables a t  
one i n s t a n t  with values (assumed by these and other observables) a t  other 
instants. 
Each of these epistemicaLly different propositions has its own causal struc- 
ture. In the first, we t reat  the tangent vector dz /d t  as effect and define its 
causal antecedents a s  w e  have done. In the integrated form, on the other hand, we 
take r ( t  ) as effect and find a correspondingly different causal structure. In gen- 
eral,  the mathematical o r  logical equivalence of two expressions of Linkage o r  
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relationship in physical systems does not a t  all connote that their causal struc- 
tures a r e  identical. This is merely a manifestation of what w a s  discussed earlier, 
that the mathematical language we use to represent physical reality has 
abstracted away the very basis on which such causal discriminations can be made. 
131 It should be recognized that this reductionistic par t  of the Newtonian paradigm can 
fail for  purely mathematical reasons. If it should happen that there  is no way to 
effectively map the master description onto some partial description, then this is 
enough to defeat a reductionistic approach to those system behaviors with which 
the partial description deals. This is quite a different matter from the one w e  a r e  
considering here,  in which no Newtonian master description ezists. and the p r e  
gram fails for  epistemoLogiccrl reasons, r a the r  than mathematical ones. 
[4] This statement is not simply my subjective assessment. In 1970 there appeared a 
volume entitled Biology and the Future  of Man, edited by Philip Handler (1970), 
then President of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA. The book went to 
great lengths to assure the reader that it spoke for  biology as a science; that in it 
biologists spoke with essentially one voice. At  the outset, it emphasized that the 
volume was not prepared as a (mere) academic exercise, but for  serious pragmatic 
purposes: 
Some years ago, the Committee on Science and Public Policy of the National 
Aaademy of Scienoes embarked on a series of 'surveys' of the scientific dis- 
ciplines. Each m e y  was to  oommenoe with an appraisal of the 'state of the 
art'. . . . In addition, the survey was toassess the nature and strength of our 
national apparatus fo r  continuing attaok on those major problems, e.g., the 
numbers and types of Zaboratories, the number of scientists in the field, the 
number of students, the funds available and their sources, and the major 
equipment being utilized. Finally, each m e y  was to  undertake a projection 
or future needs for  the national support or the discipline in question to 
assure that our  national effort in this regard is optimally productive.. . . 
To address these serious matters, the Academy proceeded as follows: 
. . . . Panels of distinguished scientists were assigned subjects.. . . Each panel 
was glven a general oharge.. .as follows: 
The prime task of each Panel is to provide a pithy summary of the status of 
the specific subfield of scienoe which has been assigned. This should be a 
olear statement of the prime scientific problems and the major questions 
currently oonfronting investigators in the field. lncluded should be an in&- 
aation of the manner in which these problems are being attaoked and how 
these approaches may change within the foreseeable future. What trends can 
be visualized for  tomorrow? What lines of investigation a r e  likely t o  sub- 
side? Which may be expected to  advanoe and assume greater importanoe? . . . 
Are the questions themselves.. . likely to change signlfiaantly? . . . . Having 
stated the major questions and problems, how close are w e  to the answers? 
The sum of these discussions, panel by panel, should constitute the equlPalent 
of a oomplete overview of the highlights of ourrent understanding of the Lffe 
Scienoes. 
There were twenty-one such Panels established, spanning the complete gamut 
of biological sciences and the biotechnologies. The recruitment for  these Panels 
consisted of wel l  over 100 eminent and influential biologists, mostly members of the 
Academy. How the panelists themselves were chosen is not indicated, but there is 
no doubt that they constituted an authoritative group. 
In due course, the Pan'els presented their reports.  How they were dealt with 
is described in colorful terms: 
. . . . In a gruelling one week session of the Survey Committee.. . each report  
w a s  merciLessly exposed to the criticism of all the other m e m b e r s . .  . . Each 
report  was then rewritten and subjected to the s e a r c h i n g ,  sometimes scath- 
i n g ,  criticisms of the members of the parent Committee on Science and Public 
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Policy. The reports w e r e  again revised in the  light of this exercise. Finally, 
the  Chairman of the  Survey Committee.. .devoted the  summer of I968 t o  the 
final editing and revising of the final work. 
Thus we have good grounds fo r  regarding the contents of this volume as  con- 
stituting a truly authoritative consensus, a t  least, as of 1970. There a r e  no minor- 
ity reports; no demurrals; biology does indeed s e e m  guaranteed here  to speak with 
one voice. 
What does that voice say? Here are a f e w  characteristic excerpts: 
The theme of this presentation is that We aan be understood in terms of the 
laws that govern and the phenomena that characterize the innntmate, physi- 
aal unlverse and, indeed, that at i ts  essenoe Ufe can be understood only in 
the language of chemistry. [emphasis added] 
A little further  along, we find this: 
Until the laws of physics and chemistry had been elucidated, t t  was not pos- 
st& euen to  p r m u h t e  the  important, penetrating questions aonoernlng the  
nature of me..  . . The endeavors of thousands of M e  scientists.. . have gone 
f a r  t o  document the  thesis.. . (that) livlng phenomena are indeed lnteUglble 
in physical terms. And although much remains to  be learned and understood. 
and the details of many prooesses remain elusive, those engaged in such 
studies hold no duu4t that answers will be forthcoming in the reasonably 
near future. Indeed, only two major questions remain enshrouded in a cloak 
of not qutte fathomable m y s t e r y :  (1) the origin of We.. .and (2) the  
mind-body problem.. . yet (the extent t o  which biology is understood) even 
now oonstitutes a satisfying and exciting tale. [emphases added] 
Still further along, w e  find things like this: 
While g b r y i n g  in how f a r  w e  have come, these ohapters also reveal how 
large is the  task that  lies ahead.. . . If (molecular biology) is exploited with 
vigor and understanding.. . a shining, hopeful future lies ahead. [emphasis 
added] 
And this: 
Molecular biology provldes the closest insight man has yet obtalned of the  
nature of life - and therefore, of himself. 
And this: 
It will be.evldent that the  huge inteIlectual triumph of the past deaade w U  in 
all llkellhood, be surpassed tomorrow - and to  the everlasting benefit of 
mankind. 
It  is clear from such rhapsodies that  the consensus reported in this volume is not 
only o r  even mainly a scientific one; it is an emotional and aesthetic one. And 
indeed, anyone familiar with the writings of Newton's contemporaries and succes- 
sors  will recognize them. 
The volume to which w e  have alluded was published in 1970. But it is most sig- 
nificant that nothing fundamental has changed since then. 
In the inimiCable words of Jacques Monod (1971, pp 42-43): 
We can assert  today that  a universal theory, however completely successful 
in other domains, could never encompass the  biosphere, its structure and i ts  
evolution as phenomena deducible from f i rs t  principles.. . . The thesis I shall 
present.. . is that  the biosphere does not contain a predictable class of 
objects o r  events but constitutes a particular occurrence, compatible with 
rirst principles but not deducible from these principles, and therefore 
essentially unpredictable. [emphasis added] 
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